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Abstract
One of the most important metaethical debates concerns the relationship between evaluative
judgments and motivation. The so-called judgment internalists claim that there is an internal
modal connection between our evaluative judgments and motivation, whereas the so-called
externalists believe that evaluative judgments are connected to desires only through contingent
external facts. This debate has reached a standoff. My aim is to introduce a completely new
argument for internalism, which does not rely on our intuitions about individual cases. I argue
that the truth of internalism explains best why the so-called transparency method yields self-
knowledge of what we desire.
Keywords Desire .Evaluative judgment . Judgment internalism.Moralpsychology.Motivation .
Self-knowledge
1 Introduction
This article investigates the relationship between evaluative judgments and motivation. I use
the term ‘evaluative judgment’ to refer to the mental state in virtue of which one counts as
sincerely accepting a sentence of the form ‘X is F’ where ‘F’ is an evaluative term such as
‘good,’ ‘desirable,’ or the like.1 I thus assume that there are necessary and sufficient conditions
for genuinely accepting the sentence ‘giving money to charity is good’ and that satisfying these
conditions requires being in a mental state called ‘the evaluative judgment’.
Because I assume a Humean view of human psychology, by ‘motivation’ I refer to a
desire (Smith 1987: 50–54). According to this theory, all mental states are either belief-like
cognitive states or desire-like conative states. Belief-like states aim at truth. They have the
mind-to-world direction of fit: an essential part of their functional role is to be sensitive to
evidence. Furthermore, on their own these states are incapable of moving agents to act. In
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2018) 21:489–503
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9923-5
1The relevant judgments concern final, all-things-considered predicative value rather than attributive,
instrumental, prudential, or distinctively moral value (Hurka 2014: §1.4).
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contrast, the functional role of desire-like states is to make the world fit their content and
so desires have the world-to-mind direction of fit. They are dispositional states consisting
of being motivated to bring about an outcome and so they can move us to act together with
beliefs about the means.
The question then is: what is the relationship between evaluative judgments and desires? If
you think that giving money to charity is good, how is that judgment related to your desire to
donate money? §2 outlines the internalist and externalist answers to this question and it also
explains how this debate’s traditional argumentative strategies have led to a standoff.
§3 then suggests that new progress can be made with arguments that have the structure of
an inference to the best explanation. As an illustration of this abductive strategy, §3 also
outlines a new argument for internalism, which I call ‘the Argument from Self-Knowledge’. It
suggests that we have reason to believe that internalism is true because its truth would best
explain how we are able to use the so-called transparency method to know what we desire.
The rest of this article defends this new argument. §3–§4 first introduce and motivate the
argument’s first preliminary premises concerning the type of self-knowledge we have of our
desires and the transparency method, which we can use to acquire such knowledge. §5–§7 then
focus on the central premise according to which internalism can explain why the transparency
method yields self-knowledge better than externalism.
2 Internalism and Externalism
Internalists argue that there is an internal connection between evaluative judgments and
desires.2 Different versions of internalism disagree about the strength of this modal connection.
Call the following thesis UNCONDITIONAL INTERNALISM3:
Necessarily, if you judge that some state of affairs S is good, then you have at least some
non-derivative desire for S to obtain.
It states that you cannot be in the mental state in virtue of which you count as thinking
that S is good unless you have at least some non-derivative desire for S to obtain. Thus,
it is impossible for you to think that giving money to charity is good if you do not have
at least some direct desire to do so. This view posits a strict internal connection between
evaluative judgments and desires.
Call the following thesis CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM4:
Necessarily, if you judge that some state of affairs S is good, then you have at least some
non-derivative desire for S to obtain or you are practically irrational (suffering from
weakness of will, depression, or other paradigmatic forms of practical irrationality).
According to this thesis, evaluative judgments create requirements of rationality to have
desires. If you are in the mental state in virtue of which you count as thinking that giving
2 For historical internalists, see Brink (1989: 29, footnote 39). For more recent defenders, see Björklund et al.
(2011) and Miller (2008: 235–236, footnotes 8–10).
3 See Stevenson (1937: 16) and Nagel (1970: part 1).
4 See Korsgaard (1986: 13–15), Smith (1994: 61, 143), Wedgwood (2007, §1.3), and van Roojen (2010: 498–
500).
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money to charity is good, then being in this state rationally requires you to have at least some
non-derivative desire to donate money. As a consequence, when you are rational (i.e., disposed
to conform to the requirements of rationality), some direct desire to give money to charity
follows from your judgment.
This article defends a version of the Argument from Self-Knowledge the conclusion of
which is CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM. If we tried to use a similar argument to argue for
UNCONDITIONAL INTERNALISM, that argument would entail that we could know what we desire
infallibly. Given that there are general reasons not to accept such views of self-knowledge, I
will focus here only on CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM.5
Externalists, in contrast, deny that there is an internal connection between evaluative
judgments and desires. They defend EXTERNALISM6:
If you genuinely judge that some state of affairs S is good and you are rational, you will
desire S to obtain only if there is some further contingent fact about you – other than
your rationality – that links your judgment to a desire.
On this view, if you judge that giving money to charity is good, it is always a further
contingent fact about you whether you also desire to do so. Furthermore, even if you lacked
any desire to donate money in this case, you could still count as fully rational.
The debate between internalists and externalists has been intensive because understanding
the relationship between evaluative judgments and desires promises to shed light on the nature
of evaluative judgments. Consider the Humean arguments for non-cognitivism: the view that
evaluative judgments are desire-like attitudes.7 These arguments have three premises: (i)
UNCONDITIONAL INTERNALISM (there is a necessary connection between evaluative judgments
and desires), (ii) Humean psychology (any mental state is either belief-like or desire-like), and
(iii) Hume’s dictum (there are no necessary connections between distinct existences). If (ii) and
(iii) are true, then UNCONDITIONAL INTERNALISM entails that evaluative judgments are desires.
Likewise, if you believe that CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM is true, you can consider what
evaluative judgments would need to be like in order to create requirements of rationality for
having the corresponding desires.8 Michael Smith argues that for this reason these judgments
must be beliefs about which outcomes fully rational versions of ourselves would want us to
bring about (Smith 1994: ch. 5). Finally, EXTERNALISM naturally leads to cognitivism: the view
that evaluative judgments are motivationally inert beliefs.
The debate between internalists and externalists has reached a standoff. Two argumentative
strategies have proven inconclusive. The first is called ‘the method of cases’. It tries to locate
patterns from individual cases by considering hypothetical scenarios involving agents, utter-
ances, actions, and attitudes. We first consult our intuitions about whether agents have made
genuine evaluative judgments in these situations and we then reflect whether EXTERNALISM or
some form of internalism better makes sense of our reactions.9
5 See Fernández (2013: 18) and Smith (1987: 46).
6 Mill and Ross are often thought to have been externalists (Korsgaard 1986: 9). Prominent contemporary
externalists include Brink (1989), Shafer-Landau (2003), and Svavarsdottir (1999).
7 See Blackburn (1984: 188).
8 Both naturalists (Smith 1994) and non-naturalists (Wedgwood 2007) have pursued this project.
9 Sometimes this method is applied by considering the utterances of which individuals and communities we
would intuitively translate to our own evaluative language. For internalist formulations, see Hare (1952: 148–
149) and Horgan and Timmons (1991). For externalist responses, see, e.g., Dowell (2016).
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Internalists focus on cases in which someone changes their mind and utters, for example,
that ‘giving money to charity is good after all’. If this person has no inclination to donate
money when she could easily do so, we think that she is being hypocritical.10 She did not
genuinely come to think that giving money to charity is good. This intuitive reaction seems to
fit internalism better. Externalists, in contrast, focus on amoral, listless and evil people, who
seem to make evaluative judgments even if they lack any desire to act accordingly.11
Externalists then claim that all forms of internalism must be false because they deny that these
groups can be both rational and making genuine evaluative judgments.
Using this method is problematic because internalists and externalists have different
intuitions about the cases and they also describe them differently. Consider St. Augustine’s
confession that he once stole pears because doing so was bad (Björnsson 2002: 339). He had
no interest in the pears themselves as he could have got better ones in more acceptable ways.
According to externalists, St. Augustine made a genuine evaluative judgment (stealing pears is
bad), but instead of having the corresponding desire not to steal he desired to steal. This is
presented as a counter-example to internalism.
Internalists deny that this description of the case is intelligible. They claim that St.
Augustine had some desire not to steal because we need the motivational pull of his judgment
to explain why pursuing the forbidden fruit was so tempting. Described in this way the case
supports internalism. Both sides then believe that their descriptions of the case are accurate,
and for this reason cases like this cannot be used to make progress.
The second debated argument is the fetishism argument (Smith 1994: 73–75). It begins from the
observation that usuallywhen a person changes hermind about what is good her desires change too.
In order to explain this, externalists must claim that the person has a de dicto desire with the content
‘that I bring about a good outcome’. This desire is needed to explain how you acquire a new desire
for givingmoney to charity when you come to believe that doing so is good. However, Smith points
out that this new desire is merely a derivative desire. It would not reflect our genuine direct concern
for other people, which is why he thinks that there is something wrong with externalism.12
In response, externalists deny that there is anything objectionable about having the de dicto
desire. Such a standing desire allegedly ‘serves as a limiting condition on the formation of
other desires’, which matches the motivations of a virtuous agent (Shafer-Landau 2003: 159).
Externalists also argue that, even if people have the de dicto desire and instrumental desires
that result from it, they can also care about things directly. As a consequence, externalists see
no reason to give up their view because of Smith’s argument either.13
3 The Argument from Self-Knowledge
I aim to show that we can construct arguments in this debate based on general philosophical
premises that do not rely on any controversial intuitions like the previous arguments. One class
10 See Björnsson (2002: 334) and Smith (1994: 6–7, 60). For an externalist response, see Copp (2001: 12).
11 For lists of discussions, see Miller (2008: 235–236, footnotes 8–10).
12 The fetishism argument is a move in the context of the broader best explanation arguments discussed below.
The difference between this argument and mine is that, in the fetishism argument, the explanandum is dependent
on our moral intuitions about how good people are motivated whereas in my argument it is not based on such
controversial intuitions.
13 See Copp (1997: 48–51), Cuneo (1999), Dreier (2000), Shafer-Landau (2003: 158–159), and Svavarsdottir
(1999: §6).
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of intuition-independent arguments have the structure of an inference to the best explanation.
For the purposes of such abductive reasoning, the internalists should search for some actual
facts the obtaining of which their theory can explain better than EXTERNALISM. If there are such
facts, they provide an intuition-independent reason for accepting a form of internalism as we
should prefer theories on the grounds of their superior explanatory power.
Consider then the following argument:
THE ARGUMENT FROM SELF-KNOWLEDGE
SELF-KNOWLEDGE: Rational agents sometimes know what they desire and some such self-
knowledge has two special features: (i) special access (ii) and strong access.
TRANSPARENCY: Rational agents can acquire self-knowledge of their desires with the features
(i) and (ii) by using the transparency method.
EXPLANATION: CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM explains why rational agents can use the
transparency method to acquire self-knowledge of their desires with the
features (i) and (ii) better than EXTERNALISM.
CONCLUSION1: TRANSPARENCY and EXPLANATION together entail that CONDITIONAL
INTERNALISM best explains some of the self-knowledge referred to in SELF-
KNOWLEDGE.
CONCLUSION2: CONCLUSION1 gives us a good reason to believe that CONDITIONAL
INTERNALISM is true.
SELF-KNOWLEDGE claims that, at least when we are rational, we can know what we presently
desire. In some cases we have true beliefs about our own present desires, and these second-
order beliefs are sufficiently sensitive to what we actually desire to count as knowledge. They
are safe in the sense that they could not have been easily false (Byrne 2005: 96–98).14 SELF-
KNOWLEDGE also claims that some of the previous type of self-knowledge of our desires is not
based on reasoning that begins from observations of behaviour. Call this the special access
feature. Furthermore, it claims that often our beliefs about our own desires are more justified
than other people’s beliefs about them. This leaves room both (i) for us having some false
beliefs about our desires and (ii) for other people knowing better in some special circum-
stances. Call this the strong access feature.
There are two strong reasons for accepting SELF-KNOWLEDGE. Firstly, this premise has been
widely accepted and defended in the self-knowledge literature.15 Secondly, andmore importantly,
denying it has significant theoretical costs. If SELF-KNOWLEDGE were false, rational agents could
know what they desire only through observing their own behaviour and their own beliefs about
their desires would therefore be nomore justified than other people’s. This would make their lives
more difficult (Shoemaker 1996: 26–39). Firstly, when rational agents pursue a shared goal, they
must be able to communicate their beliefs and desires to others. For this purpose, they must know
in advance what they believe, desire, and intend. Thus, if rational agents did not know their
attitudes before they acted, social co-operation could not run smoothly. Furthermore, without
advance knowledge of their desires, rational agents could not form plans that satisfy a combina-
tion of their different desires effectively. This means that, if you reject SELF-KNOWLEDGE, then you
14 I follow Duncan Pritchard’s understanding of safety (2009: 34–35): a subject’s belief is safe if and only if in
the close possible worlds in which the subject continues to form the relevant belief via the same belief-formation
method as in the actual world the belief continues to be true.
15 See Boyle (2009: 136), Byrne (2005: 80–81 and 2011: 202), Fernández (2013: 5–6), and Moran (2001: 10).
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need to be able to explain how co-operation and planning would be possible without the kind of
self-knowledge that SELF-KNOWLEDGE attributes to us.
§4 below explains with examples how the transparency method of TRANSPARENCY functions.
These examples will also be used to provide intuitive support for TRANSPARENCY – the claim
that the transparency method yields self-knowledge of our own desires. I should also empha-
sise that this premise too has been widely accepted and defended in the debates about self-
knowledge.16 After the next section on TRANSPARENCY, I will then focus on EXPLANATION, which
is the key premise of the Argument from Self-Knowledge.
4 The Transparency Method
TRANSPARENCY is the claim that the transparency method can provide rational agents self-
knowledge of their own desires. Let us approach this method from how we can know what we
believe. Ask yourself: do you believe that it will rain tonight? The transparency method is the
idea that you do not answer this question by turning your attention inwards to the content of
your mind but rather you look outwards – you attend to the sky. You answer the question of
whether you believe that it will rain by answering the question ‘Will it rain tonight?’. More
generally, the defenders of the transparency method claim that the way to answer any first-
personal question ‘Do I believe that P?’ is to answer the outward-directed question ‘P or not-
P?’. After you answer the latter question, you will know what you believe.
Many philosophers think that we can use a similar transparency method to know what we
desire.17 According to them, when we want to know what we desire, we do not turn our
attention inwards to the content of our minds but rather we again focus our attention outwards
to the qualities of different states of affairs and through this we come to know what we desire.
Imagine that you are having breakfast at a hotel. The buffet offers you different options: you
could have fruit, cereal, toast or porridge. Ask yourself: what do you desire to have for breakfast?
When we answer this question by using the transparency method, we first consider the qualities of
the different options: how healthy they are, whether they fill us up, whether they taste nice and so
on.18 Considering these basic qualities of our alternatives will not, however, be enough to tell us
what we desire. Merely by coming, for example, to the conclusion that fruit would be healthy you
can only come to know that you believe that the fruit are healthy (Byrne 2005: 99). In order to
know whether you have a desire to eat them, you must also consider other questions.
We can see what these additional questions are if we consider just why you would focus on
the previous basic qualities of your alternatives. Presumably you consider them because they
are the good-making qualities of those alternatives. You would be thinking of these features as
their ‘merits’. In this way, you are trying to conclude which of your alternatives would be the
best choice overall.19
16 The tradition begins from Moore (1903: 446). For the first contemporary defences, see Edgley (1969: 90) and
Evans (1982: 224–235). See also Ashwell (2013), Boyle (2009 and 2011), Byrne (2005, 2011), Burge (1996),
Fernández (2013), Gallois (1996), and Moran (2001: esp. 60–62).
17 See Ashwell (2013), Blackburn (1998: 253–255), Byrne (2005: 99–100 and 2011: 213), Gallois (1996), and
Shoemaker (1996: 47).
18 You might also consider how hungry you are or whether you feel heavy. Crucially, by considering these
features of yourself you are not searching introspectively what desires you have.
19 This type of reasoning is often automatic. You might see the options available to you and recognize one of
them as more appealing than others. However, all we need is that at least sometimes rational agents explicitly
reason in the described way.
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This suggests that, more generally, when we use the transparency method for forming
beliefs about what we desire we are making evaluative judgments – we are considering how
good different outcomes are. We then conclude that we desire an outcome S to obtain on the
basis of judging that S is good. If we conclude that S is the best outcome available for us, we
know that this is what we want most. If we judge that S is good to a degree even if it not the
best alternative overall, we know that we have at least some desire for S to obtain. Therefore,
the transparency method for answering the question ‘Do I desire S?’ relies on considering the
question ‘Is S good?’ and concluding what you desire on that basis. By reaching the
conclusion that toast would be the best option, you come to know what you want for breakfast.
TRANSPARENCY then says that, by using this method, at least when we are rational we can
acquire self-knowledge of our desires with the special and strong access features.
5 Internalist Explanations of the Transparency Method
I have introduced the Argument from Self-Knowledge as a new argument for CONDITIONAL
INTERNALISM and explained and motivated its first two premises SELF-KNOWLEDGE and TRANS-
PARENCY. In the rest, I focus on arguing for the crucial EXPLANATION premise. This section
explains how CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM plays an essential role in explaining why the transpar-
ency method yields self-knowledge. It focuses on three philosophical explanations of why this
method yields self-knowledge of our desires and how CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM naturally
supports these explanations.
5.1 Rationalism
Rationalists emphasise that we are active thinkers, which gives us an epistemic authority
over our own beliefs.20 We do not just discover that we have certain beliefs, but rather
we are responsible for our beliefs because we actively form and revise them on the basis
of reasons. We make our minds up by considering evidence in accordance with the
central norms of reasoning.
Imagine again that you are asked ‘Do you believe that it will rain tonight?’. According to
rationalists, because you are responsible for your beliefs in virtue of your rational self-control,
you would answer this question by making a decision on the basis of the best reasons available
for you. You might, for example, commit yourself to believing that it will rain because of the
murky sky. Rationalists then assume that, if you actively form a belief in critical reflection by
using the transparency method and you are conceptually competent, you will know what you
believe in the same direct way as through raising your arm and conceptual competence you
know that you have raised your arm. On this view, questions about our own beliefs are to be
understood in a practical spirit rather than in theoretical one, because they call for a resolution
rather than a discovery.21
Rationalists also believe that, as critical reasoners, we do not just discover our desires, but
rather we are responsible for our desires because we have rational control over them in
20 See Boyle (2009 and 2011), Burge (1996), and Moran (2001: §2.5–§2.6).
21 Just how this outline of an explanation (following Fernández (2013: 20)) translates to a full theory about how
self-knowledge is achieved is controversial. See Burge (1996: 100–115), Fernández (2013: 18–19), Gertler
(2011: §6.3–§6.4), and Moran (2003: 405–406).
Judgment Internalism: an Argument from Self-Knowledge 495
practical deliberation (Moran 2001: 118–119). We form and revise our desires on the basis of
the reasons we recognise. In some cases we just have brute urges: we find ourselves desiring
certain things. However, usually we make our minds up about what to desire on the basis of
reasons. Rationalists claim that, in these contexts, we answer the question ‘What do I desire?’
with a practical commitment rather than a discovery. They then use the idea that, when we use
the transparency method, we actively form our desires by considering reasons to explain why
the resulting beliefs about our desires count as knowledge. We know that we have certain
desires because we have formed them ourselves whilst using the transparency method.
How does this explanation relate to CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM? When we as rational agents
use the transparency method, we come to know what we desire by considering what is good. If
we really are forming desires in this process like the rationalists insist, then thinking about
what is good must be for rational agents a way of actively forming and revising desires (Moran
2001: 57). It is then essential to notice that thinking about what is good is an excellent way of
forming desires if the evaluative judgments in question are either desires themselves or they
have a direct, unmediated power to produce desires in us insofar as we are rational. In either
case, there would be an internal necessary connection between evaluative judgments and the
desires of rational agents just as the internalists claim. The rationalist explanation for why the
transparency method can yield self-knowledge about desires therefore works naturally if
CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM is true. CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM offers the rationalists the missing
explanation of why thinking about what is good is an excellent way of forming desires.
5.2 Byrne’s Rule of Reasoning
Alex Byrne offers an alternative explanation of why using the transparency method yields self-
knowledge (Byrne 2005, 2011). He claims that we should understand the transparency method
as an epistemic rule we can explicitly follow in our reasoning.22 In the case of beliefs, it tells us
to ‘If P, believe that you believe P!’ (Byrne 2005: 95). Byrne then observes that you explicitly
follow this rule only if you do what the consequent tells you to do when and because you think
that the antecedent is true. His main thesis is that using the rule in this way is self-verifying
(Byrne 2005: 96; Byrne 2011: 206–207). Whenever you think that the antecedent is true you
thereby believe that P and therefore your belief that you believe that P will generally be true
when you use the rule.23 For example, you see dark clouds, which suggest to you that it will
rain tonight. If you explicitly follow Byrne’s rule by starting from thinking that the antecedent
is true (which consists of thinking that it will rain tonight), the resulting belief that you believe
that it will rain tonight will be true.
A similar explanation can be offered in the context of desires. Consider the following
transparency rule of reasoning: BIf state of affairs S is good, believe that you desire S to
obtain!^ You explicitly follow this rule only if you do what the consequent tells you to do
(believe that you desire S to obtain) when and because you think that the antecedent is true
(you think that S is good).
Reasoning in accord with this rule is self-verifying for rational agents if CONDITIONAL
INTERNALISM is true. Thinking that the antecedent of the rule is true requires making an
evaluative judgment, thinking that S is good. If CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM is true, there is an
internal necessary connection between such evaluative judgments and desires in rational
22 For epistemic rules, see Byrne (2005: §7.1).
23 For a critical examination, see Ashwell (2013) and Boyle (2011).
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agents. An evaluative judgment that S is good makes it the case that you desire S to obtain
either because the evaluative judgment itself is a desire or because it has a direct, unmediated
power to produce desires in you insofar as you are a rational agent. This feature of CONDITIONAL
INTERNALISM explains why, when rational agents do what the consequent tells them to do
(believe that they desire S to obtain) on the basis of recognising that the antecedent is true (an
evaluative judgment that S is good), they acquire a true belief about their own desire.
Therefore, if CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM is true, following the rule itself makes it the case that
rational agents will have self-knowledge of your their desires, which is why using this rule is
self-verifying for them. This is why the truth of CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM supports Byrne’s
explanation of why the transparency method yields self-knowledge of our desires.
5.3 The Bypass View
The third explanation of why the transparency method yields self-knowledge is the bypass
view (Fernández 2013: ch. 2). We form our beliefs on the basis of experiences, memories,
testimony and other beliefs. For example, you might form the belief that there is an apple in
front of you on the basis of seeing one. In order for this visual experience to support your belief
about the apple, there must be a correlation between (i) having the visual experience of seeing
an apple and (ii) there being an apple in front of you.
According to Fernández (2013: 49), when you use the transparency method, you form the
second-order belief that you have a certain first-order belief on the basis of the same state that
is your ground for the relevant first-order belief. For example, the transparency method
suggests that it is natural to use the perceptual experience of seeing an apple (P) both as a
ground for believing that there is an apple in front of you (belief that P) and for the second-
order belief that you have that first-order belief (belief that you believe that P).
In order for us to be justified to form our second-order beliefs in this way, a reliable
correlation is required between being in the given grounding state and having the relevant first-
order belief. Such a correlation is enough to guarantee that being in the grounding state also
correlates with the truth of the relevant second-order belief. Hence, as long as we form beliefs
uniformly on good grounds, the beliefs about our own beliefs we form by using the transpar-
ency method will count as self-knowledge.
Fernández (2013: ch. 3) applies his bypass model also to desires. He begins from the idea
that we form our desires on the basis of other experiences, urges, desires, beliefs and
judgments. For example, you might form a desire to eat on the basis of feeling hungry. Let
us call these states on the basis of which we form desires the ‘grounds’ of those desires
(Fernández 2013: 82; Nagel 1970: 29). Evaluative judgments too are grounds of desires in this
sense. We often form a desire for the state of affairs S to obtain on the basis of thinking that S is
good. When we use the transparency method, we form beliefs about our own desires on the
basis of the grounds for those desires (Fernández 2013: 86). For example, it is natural to use
the judgment that giving money to charity is good both as a ground for desiring to give money
to charity and as a ground for the higher-order belief that you have that desire.
What then entitles you to assume that the support you have for believing that you desire S
can be the same evaluative judgment that supports your desire for S to obtain? All that is
required to justify this assumption is that there is a reliable correlation between being in the
given grounding state (evaluative judgment) and having the desire in question (Fernández
2013: 87–91). This correlation is enough to guarantee that being in the relevant grounding state
also correlates with the truth of the relevant higher-order belief. Thus, as long as we form
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desires on the basis of evaluative judgments, forming our higher-order beliefs on those same
grounds gives us knowledge of our own desires.
The truth of CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM would explain why there would be this reliable
correlation between our evaluative judgments and our desires when we are rational.
Internalists, after all, argue that there is an internal necessary connection between evaluative
judgments and desires either because evaluative judgments themselves are desires or because
they have a direct, immediate power to produce desires in us insofar as we are rational agents.
This is why the internalists can endorse Fernández’s bypass explanation of why the transpar-
ency method yields self-knowledge of our desires. They can provide Fernández the required
modal link between the evaluative judgments and desires of rational agents that justifies the
higher-order beliefs about their own desires, which rational agents form on the basis of the
evaluative judgments when they use the transparency method. This is why INTERNALISM
supports also Fernández’s explanation of why the transparency method yields self-
knowledge of our desires.
This section has shown how CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM naturally supports the three best
philosophical explanations of why the transparency method yields self-knowledge of our
desires. Recall that EXPLANATION claims that CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM can explain why the
transparency method yields self-knowledge of our desires better than EXTERNALISM. This
section has then argued only for one half of this premise: that CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM
explains well why the transparency method yields self-knowledge of our desires when we
are rational. The next section will argue for the second half: the externalists cannot explain
why the transparency method works equally well.
6 Externalist Explanations of the Transparency Method
Externalists have at least the following three potential ways to explain how the transparency
method yields self-knowledge of our desires:
(i) Externalists could explain why making evaluative judgments would be a good way of
forming desires even if EXTERNALISM were true and so vindicate the rationalist account of
the transparency method.
(ii) Externalists could explain why using Byrne’s transparency rule of reasoning would self-
verifying even if EXTERNALISM were true and so vindicate Byrne’s self-verification
account of the transparency method.
(iii) Externalists could explain how there could be a reliable correlation between evaluative
judgments and desires even if EXTERNALISM were true and so vindicate the bypass
account of the transparency method.
All these strategies require the same: showing that there could be a strong enough correlation
between evaluative judgments and desires even if EXTERNALISM were true. Such a correlation
would make evaluative judgments (a) a good way of forming desires, (b) Byrne’s transparency
rule self-verifying, and (c) justify using evaluative judgments as grounds for both desires and
higher-order beliefs about those desires. Thus, all the externalists need is an account of a strong
correlation between evaluative judgments and desires that is compatible with EXTERNALISM. I
will first consider correlations grounded on biological and cultural facts and then ones
grounded on de dicto desires for bringing about good outcomes.
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6.1 Biological and Cultural Facts
In order to create a sufficiently strong correlation between our evaluative judgments and
desires, externalists could first argue that, due to (ii) contingent biological facts about human
psychology or (ii) contingent cultural facts, people who make evaluative judgments tend to
have the corresponding desires (Shafer-Landau 2003: 159). Externalists could then claim that
these biological and cultural links are enough to explain why using the transparency method
yields self-knowledge of our desires.
The problem is that externalists have only suggested that there might be some biological or
cultural facts that create a correlation between evaluative judgments and desires, but they have
not described what those facts are. Because of this, we cannot judge what kind of correlations
between our evaluative judgments and desires these additional facts might produce and
whether these correlations would be strong enough to support the philosophical explanations
of why the transparency method yields self-knowledge of our desires when we are rational.
This means that currently the internalist explanation of why the transparency method yields
self-knowledge is the best explanation because it is the only explanation.
Therefore, at least the outlined argument presents the externalists with a challenge: they
have to be able to produce as good explanations (based on some specific actual biological or
cultural facts) of why the transparency method yields self-knowledge as the internalist
explanations outline above. Until externalists have provided these explanations, the Argument
from Self-Knowledge gives us a reason to prefer CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM. Currently then,
CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM has an advantage because it can explain something that EXTERNALISM
leaves mysterious: how we can know what we desire by thinking about what is good.
This challenge will not be trivial. The externalist accounts will have to explain why
the self-knowledge rational agents gain by using the transparency method is safe: why
the beliefs about their own desires formed by thinking about what is good could not have
been easily false. Here we need to consider the closest worlds in which the biological
and cultural facts are just slightly different from the ones used in the real externalist
explanations. The concern is that in those worlds rational agents could be using the
transparency method to form false beliefs about their desires without noticing, which will
threaten the safety of the true beliefs formed with the transparency method in the actual
world. The externalists will insist that the previous worlds are sufficiently far away from
the actual world so as not to threaten the safety of the actual beliefs. However, for this
response to work, the externalists would need to describe what the relevant biological
and cultural facts are as only then they would be able to give an account of just why
these worlds are not close enough to the actual world to be relevant for safety. Without
this type of an account, the externalist explanations of the transparency method threaten
to leave the safety of our self-knowledge of our desires unexplained.
6.2 De Dicto Desires
The externalists could also return to their explanation of how our desires change when we
make evaluative judgments. This explanation is based on the de dicto desire with the content
‘that I bring about a good outcome’ (§1). According to externalists, this desire – together with
a belief that an outcome is good – leads to a derivative desire for bringing about the relevant
outcome. Externalists could then argue that the existence of the background de dicto desire for
good outcomes is sufficient for creating a reliable correlation between our evaluative
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judgments and the corresponding desires. This correlation would be enough to explain why the
transparency method yields self-knowledge of our desires.
This proposal too faces a challenge.24 Let us stipulate that Daniel is an actual agent, who
has the relevant de dicto desire and who forms true beliefs about his own desires with the
transparency method. There is then a range of close possible worlds in which Daniel lacks the
de dicto desire and in which he is also inclined to use the transparency method. In order for
Daniel’s actual beliefs about his desires to count as self-knowledge, these beliefs must be safe.
This entails that, in the close worlds in which Daniel lacks the de dicto desire, something must
alert him of the fact that, if he were to use the transparency method, he would form false
beliefs. The only potential warning-sign then seems to be awareness of the existence of the de
dicto desire itself. If Daniel were able to easily know whether he has this desire in the relevant
close worlds, he could use this self-knowledge to determine whether he can use the transpar-
ency method to acquire self-knowledge of his other desires in those worlds. The question then
is: how could Daniel know whether he has the relevant de dicto desire?
The externalists cannot claim that Daniel could come know that he has the relevant de dicto
desire by using the transparency method itself. After all, Daniel is considering in a range of
close possible worlds whether he is able to use the transparency method to form true beliefs
about his desires. The externalists also cannot claim that Daniel could know that he has this
desire on the basis of observing his own behaviour. In that case, Daniel would be unable to
know whether he is entitled to use the transparency method before he has observed his own
behaviour. This means that Daniel would be unable to acquire self-knowledge with the special
access feature (§2). The externalists then owe us an alternative explanation of how we can
know whether we have the relevant de dicto desire for bringing about good outcomes under
that description.
7 Alternative Accounts of Self-Knowledge
In addition to the transparency method, there are two other orthodox views of self-knowl-
edge.25 Firstly, externalists could attempt to defend acquaintance theories of self-knowledge.26
When applied to desires, they claim that desires are ‘luminous’ or ‘self-presenting’ – they have
a certain phenomenal feel as a part of their essence.27 On this view, there is something it is like
to have desires, and thus a direct awareness of a desire is built into the desire itself. We are then
supposed to know what we desire because we stand in the metaphysical relation of immediate
acquaintance to our desires.
Some desires admittedly have a phenomenal feel to them (Russell 1912: 77; Smith
1987: 45). There is something it is like to desire food when you are hungry. However,
not all desires have a special phenomenology. Many calm desires are dispositional states
that play a role in the causal explanations of actions even if we are not immediately
aware of them (Smith 1987: 46–47). Consider Smith’s example: John is pursuing a career
in arts, but ceases to do so after his mother’s death. Previously John thought that he is
pursuing this career for the sake of art itself, but now he comes to recognize that he was
24 These same problems also apply to the externalist higher-order desire strategy (see Dreier 2000).
25 Here I follow Gertler (2011).
26 For contemporary defenders, see Gertler (2011: 94).
27 See Platts (1979: 256).
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motivated by a desire to please his mother. It seems plausible to ascribe this desire to
John in order to explain his previous behaviour even if he never had immediate
awareness of it. This means that at best the acquaintance theory can explain how we
know about a limited class of desires. It also means that externalists still need to explain
in some other way how we can acquire self-knowledge of our calm dispositional desires
such as the de dicto desire with the content ‘that I bring about a good outcome’.
Externalists could also attempt to defend inner sense theories of self-knowledge, which
attempt to understand self-knowledge with the model of perception.28 Perhaps in addition
to our outer senses, we also have a special faculty of an inner sense. It can be understood as
the brain’s self-scanning mechanism, which is causally sensitive to the target beliefs and
desires in the same way as our ears are sensitive to sounds. The inputs to this mechanism
are our beliefs and desires and the outputs higher-order beliefs about those inputs. The
reliability of our self-knowledge is then explained by the idea that the output states of
introspection are causally sensitive to the input beliefs and desires they are about.
There are many well-known objections to this theory of self-knowledge.29 Firstly, the
inner-sense theories describe a sub-personal mechanism, a brain-level scanning mecha-
nism that is causally responsible for the production of our second-order beliefs. How-
ever, on the personal level of deliberation, when that mechanism causes us to have
second-order beliefs there would be no evidence or reasons we can cite in support of
those beliefs (Fernández 2013: 28–36; Peacocke 1999: 224–225). This is because the
functioning of the mechanism itself is inaccessible to us in reflection. As a consequence,
the inner-sense theories threaten to leave us in the position of ‘the infallible psychic who
just finds herself believing things about the future for no good reason’ (Zimmermann
2006, 349). The critics argue that, when it comes to self-knowledge, we simply are not in
this position: there are things we can say to support our self-knowledge.30
The second objection begins from the intuitive idea that self-knowledge is necessarily
asymmetrical (Gertler 2002: §2). The way we know what we believe and desire is
necessarily such that others could not use that same method to know what we believe
and desire. It is then argued that the inner-sense theories can only support contingent
asymmetry. As it happens, our self-scanning mechanisms are wired so that our own
beliefs and desires reliably cause higher-order beliefs only in us. However, if the inner-
sense views were true, nothing would rule out creating a similar scanning mechanism
that would connect causally your beliefs and desires to my brain and thus give me the
same knowledge of your mental states as you have. The critics of the view argue that the
inner sense views must be defective because they leave room for this possibility.
8 Conclusion
The aim of this article was to show that we can make new progress in one of the most
important metaethical debates that has reached a standoff. I suggested that we cannot make
such progress as long as we rely on strategies that are based on controversial intuitions about
28 For contemporary defenders, see Gertler (2011: 132).
29 For an overview, see Gertler (2011: §5.3–§5.5). For additional objections, see Boghossian (1989), Burge
(1996: 105) and Moran (2001: 13–15).
30 These critics claim that, for this reason, the inner-sense views must be committed themselves to implausible
forms of externalism in epistemology (Peacocke 1999: 241).
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individual cases or virtuous agents. I then argued that the way forward is to consider what
actual facts the truth of different forms of internalism could explain best. The abductive
reasoning to the best explanation of those facts would provide an intuition-independent
argument for the internalist theories.
As an illustration of this strategy, I outlined the Argument from Self-Knowledge with
three premises: rational agents sometimes know what they desire and some of this
knowledge has the special and strong access features (SELF-KNOWLEDGE); rational agents
can get such self-knowledge by using the transparency method (TRANSPARENCY); and
CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM explains why the transparency method yields self-knowledge
of desires better than EXTERNALISM (EXPLANATION). The rest of this article then defended
this argument. §3–§4 explained and motivated the first two general preliminary premises
SELF-KNOWLEDGE and TRANSPARENCY. After this, the article focused on arguing for the key
premise EXPLANATION. This means that, if my arguments in §5–§7 for EXPLANATION work,
an intuition-independent argument for CONDITIONAL INTERNALISM can be given by
defending SELF-KNOWLEDGE and TRANSPARENCY in the philosophy of self-knowledge
where these claims have already been widely accepted.
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